




Economic Value Added - A General Perspective 




This paper explains the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) that is gaining popularity in India. The 
paper examines whether EVA is a superior performance measure both for corporate reporting and for 
internal governance. It relied on empirical studies in U.S.A. and other advance economies. It concluded 
that though EVA does not provide additional information to investors, it can be adapted as a corporate 
philosophy for motivating and educating employees to differentiate between value creating and value 
destructing activities. This would lead to direct all efforts in creating shareholder value. The paper brings to 




It is now well settled that the aim of every business entity should be to maximize 
shareholders wealth by enhancing the firm’s value and all the activities of a firm should 
be directed to achieve this objective. Various theories of firm conceptualize a firm in 
various ways and provide an understanding of factors that contribute to the success of a 
firm. 
 
The neo classical view of the firm envisages a business entity as decision-maker based on 
the supply and demand of both input and output markets. Organizational theory view 
addresses aspects of a firm ignored by neoclassical economics. Disposing of the notion of 
the firm as a singular decision-maker and recognizing the firm as a complex organization 
encompassing multiple individuals, organization theory analyses the internal structure of 
the firm and the relationships between its constituent units and departments. The best 
explanation that has revolutionized the way we look at the business entity is given by 
Richard Coase who defined the business entity from a Transaction cost view. It explains 
the existence of the firm with respect to the reduction in costs of contractual 
arrangements between the buyers and sellers of productive resources. One can say that 
the ability of the firm to continue to be competitive for generating surplus depends on its 
ability to reduce transaction costs between the buyers and sellers of the productive 
resources. The network view argues that the business entity once formed is not an 




(e.g., persons, organizations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, 
transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specified type (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, 
and Marsden, 1978:458). In other words,  an organization’s productivity is determined 
less by its internal resources than by the set of resources that it can mobilize through its 
contacts. The more such contacts the firm has, the better it is ‘plugged in’ to the key task 
and  influence processes of the industry, and the stronger is its strategic advantage 
(Madhavan, Balaji, John, 1998). The Agency view and Stewardship view, which are two 
opposite views regarding the conflict of interests between the various agencies involved 
in the management of the firm. Agency theory argues that unless managers are monitored 
constantly they act in self-interest, which might be at variance with interests of residual 
claimants most importantly those of shareholders. This variance can be reduced only 
through the added costs of monitoring or designing appropriate incentive structures 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand the  stewardship theory argues that 
managers interests lie in the well being of the organization and they are at variance with 
other stakeholders only when the managers’ position is threatened due to environmental 
threats like mergers, acquisitions and takeovers (Donaldson, 1990). The resource-based 
view  argues that the firm is bundle of tangible and intangible resources and an 
organization's success is dependent upon the efficient deployment of these resources to 
their best advantage (Grant 1991). The knowledge based view argues that the firm is a 
institution that creates an environment under which multiple individuals can integrate 
their specialist knowledge with low incentives designed to foster co-ordination between 
individual specialists, thus avoiding the problems of opportunism associated with  high 
incentives directly related to knowledge transactions (Grant, 1996). 
 
The theories, taken together, explain that the success of the business entity in maximizing 
the firm-value depends on the effectiveness of integrating interests of the firms 
stakeholders and managers by designing suitable incentive scheme; by improving 
productivity of resources in the face of uncertainties, by efficient networking with other 
institutions and social agents; and by reducing transaction costs. This paper examines the 
                                                                                                                                                                             




effectiveness of  Economic Value Added (EVA) in improving the performance of the 
firm as a whole and also as a measure of performance. 
 
Performance Measurement 
Investors measure overall performance of a firm as a whole to decide whether to invest in 
the firm or to continue with the firm or to exit from it. In order to achieve goal 
congruence, managers’ compensation is often linked with the performance of the 
responsibility centers and also with firm-performance. Therefore selection of the right 
measure is critical to the success of a firm. To measure performance of a firm we need a 
simple method for correctly measuring value created/ enhanced by it in a given time 
frame. All the current metrics trade off between the precision in measuring the value and 
its cost of measurement. In other words, each method takes into consideration the degree 
of complexities in quantifying the underlying measure. The more complex is the process, 
the more is the level of subjectivity and cost in measuring the performance of the firm. 
There is a continuous endeavor to develop a single measure that captures the overall 
performance, yet it is easy to calculate. 
 
Each metric of performance claims its superiority over others. Performance of a firm is 
usually measured with reference to its past record and the performance of other firms 
with comparable risk profile. The various performance metrics currently in use are based 
on the returns on investment generated by the business entity . Therefore to reach a  
meaningful conclusion, returns generated by the firm in a particular year should be 
compared with returns generated by assets with similar risk profile (cross sectional 
analysis). Similarly return on investment for the current period should be compared with 
returns generated in past (time series analysis). A firm creates value only if it is able to 
generate return higher than its cost of capital. Cost of capital is the weighted average cost 
of equity and debt(WACC).  
 
The performance of a firm gets reflected on its valuation by the capital market. Market 
valuation reflects investor’s perception about the current performance of the firm and 




estimated growth of the business in terms of return on capital. This results in an 
incongruence between current performance and the value of the firm. Even if the current 
performance is better in relative terms, poor growth prospects adversely affects the value 
of the firm. Therefore any metric of performance, to be effective, should be able to not 
only capture the current performance but also should be able to incorporate the direction 
and magnitude of future growth.  Therefore the robustness of a measure is borne out by 
the degree of correlation the particular metric has with respect to the market valuation. 
Perfect correlation is impossible because as shown by empirical researchers, 
fundamentals of a company cannot fully explain its market capitalization, other factors 
such as speculative activities, market sentiments and macro-economic factors influence 
movement in share prices. However the superiority of a performance metric over others 
lies in providing better information to investors.  
 
Metrics of performance have a very important and critical role not only in evaluating the 
current performance of a firm but also in achieving high performance and growth in the 
future. The metrics of performance have a variety of users, which include all the 
stakeholders whose well being depends on the continued well being of the firm. Principal 
stakeholders are the equity holders, debt holders, management, and suppliers of material 
and services, employees and the end-users of the products and services. Value creation 
and maximization depends on the alignment of the various conflicting interests of these 
stakeholders towards a common goal. This means maximization of the firm value without 
jeopardizing the interests of any of the stakeholders. Any metric, which measures the 
firm value without being biased towards any of the stakeholders or particular class of 
participants, can be hailed as the true metric of performance. However it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to develop such a metric. 
 
Most of the conventional performance measures directly relate to the current net income  
of a business entity with equity, total assets, net sales or similar surrogates of inputs or 
outputs. Examples of such measures are return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) 
and operating profit margin. Each of these indices measure a different aspect of 




ROA measures the asset productivity and operating profit margin reflects the margin 
realized by the firm at the market place. The net income figure in itself is dependent on 
the operational efficiency, financial leverage and the ability of the entity to formulate 
right strategy to earn adequate margin in the market place.  
 
It is important to note that none of these measures truly reflect the complete picture by 
themselves but have to be seen in conjunction with other metrics. These measures are 
also plagued by the firm level inconsistencies in the accounting figures as well as the 
inconsistencies in the valuation methods used by accountants in measuring assets, 
liabilities and income of the firm. Accounting valuation methods are in variance with the  
methods that are being used to value individual projects and firms. The value of an asset 
or a firm, which is a collection of assets, is computed by discounting future stream of 
cash flows. The net present value (NPV) is the surplus that the investment is expected to 
generate over the cost of capital. Measures of periodical performance of a firm, which is 
the collection of assets in place, should follow the same underlying principles. Economic 
value added (EVA)
2 is a measure that captures the valuation principles.    
 
ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED – the concept 
EVA is the most misunderstood term among  the practitioners of corporate finance. The 
proponents of EVA are presenting it as the wonder drug of the millennium in overcoming 
all corporate ills at one stroke and ultimately help in increasing the wealth of the 
shareholder, which is synonymous with the maximization of the firm value. The 
attractiveness of the EVA lies in its use of cash flow and cost of capital that are 
determinant of the value of the firm. 
  
In the process, EVA is being bandied about with utmost impunity by all and sundry, 
which includes the popular press. The academic world in its turn has come up with 
various empirical studies which either supports the superiority of EVA or questions the 
claim of its proponents. Currently the empirical evidence is split almost half way. 




EVA is nothing but a new version of the age-old residual income concept recognized by 
economists since the 1770's. Both EVA and ‘residual income’ concepts are based on the 
principle that a firm creates wealth for its owners only if it generates surplus over the cost 
of the total invested capital. So what is new? Perhaps EVA could bring back the lost 
focus on ‘economic surplus’ from the current emphasis on accounting profit. In a lighter 
vein it can be said that in an era where commercial sponsorship is the ticket to the 
popularity of even the concept of god, the concept of residual income has not found a 
good sponsor until Stern Stewart and Company has adopted it and relaunched it with a 
brand new name of EVA.  
 
 
Technically speaking EVA is nothing but the residual income after factoring the cost of 
capital into net operating profit after tax. But this is only the tip of the iceberg as will be 
seen in the next few sections. The paper examines  EVA both as a measure of overall 





EVA= (adjusted NOPAT - cost of capital) x capital employed-------(I) 
Or 
EVA = (Rate of return - cost of capital) x capital  ---------(II) 
 
Where;  
Rate of Return = NOPAT/Capital 
Capital = total assets minus non interest bearing debt, at the beginning of the year 
Cost of capital = cost of equity x proportion of equity + cost of debt (1-tax rate) x 
proportion of debt in the capital. 
The above cost of capital is nothing but the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
                                                                                                                                                                             




Cost of equity is normally estimated using capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that 
estimates the expected return commensurate with the riskiness of the assets.  
If we define ROI as NOPAT/capital then the above equation can be rewritten as  
 
EVA= (ROI- WACC) x CAPITAL EMPLOYED-----(III)  
Capital being used in EVA calculation is not the book capital, capital is defined as an 
approximation of the economic book value of all cash invested in going-concern business 
activities, capital is essentially a company’s net assets (total assets less non-interest-
bearing current liabilities), but with three adjustments: 
  Marketable securities and construction in progress are subtracted. 
  The present value of noncapitalized leases is added to net property, plant, and 
equipment. 
  Certain equity equivalent reserves are added to assets: 
¾  Bad debt reserve is added to receivables. 
¾  LIFO reserve is added to inventories. 
¾  The cumulative amortization of goodwill is added back to goodwill 
¾  R&D expense is capitalized as a long-term asset and smoothly depreciated over 5 
years (a period chosen to approximate the economic life typical of an investment in 
R&D). 
¾  Cumulative unusual losses (gains) after taxes are considered to be a long-term 
investment. 
A firm can motivate its managers to direct their effort towards maximizing the value of 
the firm only by, first measuring the firm value correctly and secondly by providing 
incentives to managers to create value. Both are interdependent and they complement 
each other. Therefore this paper examines the EVA concept from two perspectives, EVA 
as a performance measure and EVA as a corporate philosophy. 
 
We shall examine EVA as a performance measure to assess whether it conveys any 
additional information to investors over conventional performance measures. In other 





Examining EVA as a corporate philosophy we intend to look at the efficacy of EVA 
when implemented at every level of managerial decision making process to encourage 
managers to deploy resources only on value enhancing activities and to align the interests 
of shareholders with managers. This involves two things, one is linking managerial 
compensation package with EVA and second is to inculcate the culture of evaluating 
every action from the viewpoint that it should generate EVA. The ultimate outcome 
should be enhancement in the firm-value measured by the capital market. When EVA is 
used as a management philosophy, it results in the enhancement of productivity by 
continuously focusing on return vis-à-vis cost of capital. However as market discounts 
expected long term performance of the firm, any compensation that motivates 
enhancement of short term EVA, may not maximize the firm value. 
 
However with EVA culture, the firm as a whole focuses on the economic surplus and that 
definitely improves value enhancement process. Of course, this can be achieved even by 
implementing the other practices but the simplicity of EVA in communicating the very 
fundamental principle, that generation of surplus over cost of capital can only enhance 
the firm value, makes it a management technique superior to other planning and control 
techniques. We shall examine the appropriateness of this perception. 
  
EVA AS A PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
  
Proponents of EVA argue that EVA is a superior measure as compared to other 
performance measures on four counts: 
  it is nearer to the real cash flows of  the business entity;  
  it is easy to calculate and understand;  
  it has a higher correlation to the market value of the firm and  
  its application to employee compensation leads to the alignment of  managerial 
interests with those of the shareholders, thus minimizing the supposedly 
dysfunctional behavior of the management.  
The last two merits can be considered as a reflection of the first two. If EVA truly 




understand, then it automatically follows that it should be closely related to the market 
valuation and it should minimize the dysfunctional behavior of the management when 
used as an incentive measure. In other words, close relation to market valuation and 
convergence of managerial interests with shareholders interests is a vindication of EVA 
as a superior metric.  
 
EVA as a performance measure looks into the efficacy of EVA both as an absolute 
measure in comparison with net income, residual income and similar measures as well as 
a ratio in relation with performance measures like  ROE, ROA and Operating Profit 
Margin, which are commonly used by both managers and equity analysts alike. These 
measures are normally used internally by the management to evaluate employee 
performance, incentive calculation and investment decisions and externally by equity 
analysts to ascertain the performance and growth of the firm. Along with these measures 
valuation models like NPV, IRR, Payback period and Book rate of return are used both 
internally and externally by managers for investment decisions. The former measures are 
backward looking measures which take into account past and current performance and 
facilitates prediction of future performance, whereas latter measures are more forward 
looking and discount the expected future cash flow streams associated with a given 
investment or new investment to ascertain the economic viability of the same. 
 
EVA a superior performance measure? 
 
First let us look into the claim of EVA being superior than the conventional measures 
such as ROI, ROE and ROA, which are based on the accounting figures. Most of these 
measures give us the rate of return earned by the firm with respect to capital invested in 
the firm. The most important limitation of these measures are derived from limitations 
inherent in the measurement of accounting profit. As per current accounting practices, 
while historical-cost-based accounting measures are being used to carry most of the 
assets in the balance sheet, revenue and expenses (other than depreciation) are recognized 
in the profit and loss account at their current value. Therefore accounting rate of returns 




initial years and upwards in the latter years. Similarly as noted by Malkelainen (Esa 
Malkelainen 1998), distortion occurs basically due to the historical cost and straight line 
depreciation schedule used by most businesses to value their assets. This leads to a bias 
in these measures due to the composition of assets of a firm at any given point in time. 
By composition he refers to the current nature of the assets, more current the assets are, 
the accounting rate of return is closer to the true rate of return. This distortion will not be 
significant if there is a continuous stream of investments in assets i.e. the value of the mix 
of assets is nearer to the current value of the assets. But the probability, that at any point 
of time, a firm should have such a composition of assets is rare, in most cases either the 
assets are old or relatively new. This precludes these accounting measures from being 
used to reach any meaningful conclusion regarding the true performance of the firm. 
 
 The other important limitation of accounting measures is that they ignore the cost of 
equity and only consider the borrowing cost. As a result it ignores the risk inherent in the 
project and fails to highlight whether the return is commensurate with the risk of the 
underlying assets. This might result in selecting projects that produce attractive rate of 
return but destroys firm value because their cost of capital is higher than the benchmark 
return established by the management. On the other hand accounting measures encourage 
managers to select projects that will improve the current rate of return and to ignore 
projects even if their return is higher than their cost of capital. Selection of projects with 
returns higher than the current rate of return does not automatically increase 
shareholders’ wealth. Taking up only those projects, which provide returns that are 
higher than the hurdle rate (cost of capital) results in increasing the wealth of the 
shareholder. Therefore use of ROE, ROA or similar accounting measures as the 
benchmark, might result in selection of those projects that though provide rate of return 
higher than the current rate of return destroys firm-value. Similarly use of these measures 
result in continuing with activities that destroys firm value until the rate of return falls 
below the benchmark rate of return. 
 
EVA proponents claim that because of these imperfections, the accounting based 




these measures does not encourage value enhancement actions by managers. Value 
enhancement and earnings are two different things and might be at cross-purposes 
because short-term performance might be improved at the cost of long term health of the 
firm. Activities involving enhancement of current earnings may be short term in nature, 
whereas any value enhancing activities should focus on long term well being of the firm. 
Avoidance of discretionary costs improves current performance while destroying value of 
the firm. Managers’ focus on short-term performance will increase as long as their 
rewards are tied to the current performance over long-term value enhancement 
(Damodaran 1998, David Young 1999). 
 
The question arises whether EVA is an improvement over conventional measures and 
serves the purpose of motivating managers to pay attention to shareholders value even if 
that results in compromising current performance. The answer may be negative because 
all the above limitations are also associated with EVA. As shown in equation III the 
calculation of EVA entails the usage of a accounting rate of return, the difference lies 
only in the fact that the cost of equity  is also factored in to arrive at the residual income 
figure. Though incorporation of the cost of equity capital is the virtue of EVA, because it 
measures economic surplus, it does not remove the limitations of the accounting profit 
that forms the basis for computing EVA. Moreover the virtue might not be realized in 
practice since it is not easy to calculate the cost of equity. Market returns cannot be used 
as a proxy for cost of equity that supports assets in place because market discounts the 
expectations. Similarly it is difficult to use CAPM in measuring cost of equity because it 
is difficult to measure risk-free-rate of return, beta and market premium. Difficulties get 
compounded in an economic environment like India, where interest rates fluctuate 
frequently, the capital market is volatile and the regulators are yet to have a complete grip 
on the capital market to enhance its efficiency. Empirical studies show that the volatility 
in the Indian capital markets, like capital markets in other developing economies, is 
higher than capital markets in developed economies (Tushar Waghmare 2000). Similarly 
studies show that beta for companies listed in Indian capital markets is not stable (Sanyal, 
Guha Roy and Sanyal 2000). It is difficult to ascertain the market premium because of 




decade and also because of its high volatility. Therefore even if for the sake of argument 
it can be said that the potential of EVA as a measure of performance can be realized fully 
in an advanced economy, the argument that EVA is a better measure is not tenable in the 
Indian context. 
 
In India EVA is being used with impunity. A case at point is the study published by 
Economic times (11
th December 2000)
3 , on corporate performance. While computing 
EVA it used a flat rate of 13 percent as the cost of capital of all the enterprises included 
in the study. The study explains that an average 13 percent interest for both the years 
covered by the study is used as it is almost equal to the prime-lending rate of the 
commercial bank and financial institution. It is a basic principle of economics that 
‘higher the risk higher is the expected return’. By estimating WACC at 13% this basic 
principle is violated. It may be argued that cost of debt should be taken post-tax and 
therefore effective cost of equity incorporated in the calculation is higher than 13 percent. 
Even if this argument is accepted the computation cannot be defended because the cost of 
capital is estimated without using any accepted economic model. Moreover by using a 
flat rate, variation in risk profiles of firms have been ignored. This shows both the 
popularity of EVA in India and difficulties in measuring the same. The study has also 
ignored adjustments in capital and operating income suggested by proponents of EVA 
 
Is EVA simple to understand and calculate ? 
 
The proponents of EVA propose certain adjustments in accounting figures to calculate a 
proxy for economic capital. The objectives of such adjustments are: 
1)  to measure capital at closer to the current value; 
2)  to include all investments that are treated as period costs by accountants (such as 
R&D expenditure) and 
3)  to bring EVA closer to the real cash flows of the company. 
The Stern Stewart & Co.  which is the front runner in eulogizing the utility of EVA, 




EVA. These adjustments truly complicate the calculation of  EVA. Most enterprises do 
not maintain in-depth data required for these adjustments and even if it is maintained it is 
not accessible to outsiders and it further complicates the computation. For the insiders 
who have access to the data these adjustments make the calculation too complicated to 
necessitate the hiring of a consultant. This involves additional costs, which are often not 
insignificant. Taking this into account most of the EVA proponents recommend that these 
adjustments have to be scaled down based on the relevance and incremental information 
that they offer.  
 
Stewart argues that distortions in GAAP-based accounting should be corrected to the 
extent that it is practical to do so, which means that adjustments should be made only if:  
1)  the amounts are significant; 
2)  managers can influence the outcome of the item being adjusted; 
3)  the required information is readily available; and  
4)  non-finance professionals can understand them. (Stewart 1991). 
Thus Out of these 160 odd adjustments around 15 adjustments are considered crucial by 
die hard EVA proponents but in recent years this requirement has been scaled down 
significantly by many consultants to around five to six adjustments. 
These adjustments are aimed at : 
1)  producing an EVA figure that is closer to cash flows, and less subject to the 
distortions of accrual accounting; 
2)  removing the arbitrary distinction between investments in tangible assets, which 
are capitalized, and intangible assets, which tend to be written off as incurred; 
3)  prevent the amortization, or write-off, of goodwill; 
4)  eliminate the use of successful efforts accounting;  
5)  bring off-balance sheet debt into the balance sheet; and  
6)  correct biases caused by accounting depreciation. ( S David Young,1999) 
 
Although many adjustments to GAAP-based accounting profit are possible, the following 
are the most commonly proposed:  
                                                                                                                                                                             




1. Non-recurring gains and losses.  
2. Research and development expenses.  
3. Deferred taxes.  
4. Provisions for warranties and bad debts.  
5. LIFO reserves.  
6. Goodwill.  
7. Depreciation.  
8. Operating leases. 
 
Studies that endeavored to find out the benefits of these adjustments concluded that they 
are largely irrelevant and result in only incremental addition to the information produced 
by EVA, even if adjustments are tailored to the nature of the business of the company. 
The main argument put forward is that even though the logic behind these adjustments is 
impeccable, whether these adjustments help in countering any dysfunctional or sub-
optimal behavior of the managerial staff is suspect. It is argued that these adjustments are 
more crucial for the external user. But for most firms, adjusted EVA offers few 
advantages over unadjusted EVA. Moreover it carries the costs of increased complexity 
and any other costs that arise when profit measures deviate from GAAP.  In short, the 
residual income measure first proposed by Alfred Sloan seventy-five years ago is likely 
to offer the same advantages as today's highly advertised EVA. (S.David Young 1999).  
 
As mentioned above the veracity of EVA is dependant on the various adjustments 
proposed to minimize the accounting biases, which in itself is a complicated process. 
Other than this the increase in the number of adjustments increase the subjectivity 
involved in measuring EVA(Damodaran 1998). It is very difficult to and almost 
impossible to quantify all the value enhancement activities of a firm without involving lot 
of subjective estimates and therefore even with the various accounting adjustments 
proposed to remove the accounting biases in the estimation, EVA computation tends to 





Though the idea of EVA is simple and theoretically elegant, its implementation is 
difficult and often takes away much of the potential benefits.  
 
Is EVA a better signal to the capital market ? 
Capital market theories have established cash flow based valuation models that are 
extensively used by analysts for valuation of firms and equity. It is highly improbable 
that a single number can capture all the inputs required by those models. Aggregation 
results in loss of information. Therefore accounting standard setters and regulators, all 
over the globe, require firms to be transparent and disclose information that financial 
statements fail to capture, either as a part of financial statements or by way of a separate 
report. Analysts use those information along with information collected from other 
sources, to value firms. However they often use a single figure, like ROI, as a signal for 
‘good and bad news’. EVA should be considered a superior substitute of ROI or similar 
measures only if it provides a better signal. 
 
Independent researchers concluded that even though EVA is correlated to stock returns, it 
is not much greater than the correlation between accounting profit and stock return. 
Therefore though EVA might be incrementally better over other measures, it does not 
really provide any significant informational advantage. It is pertinent to note that this 
conclusion is drawn by empirical studies that used the database created and maintained 
by Stern Stewart & Co (Dodd & Chen 1997; Biddle, Bowen & Wallace 1999). Therefore 
chances of bias due to incomplete data are almost eliminated. Empirical studies in other 
countries have also confirmed that EVA does not provide better signal to the capital 
market. If the empirical studies globally do not provide evidence to support the argument 
that EVA provides a better signal to the capital market, it may be easily concluded that 
results of similar studies will not be different for companies listed in the Indian stock 
exchanges because Indian capital markets are less efficient as compared to markets in 
advanced economies. In India it is even more difficult to have a database for conducting 
such studies and therefore even if some studies show results different from the 





EVA as a Corporate Philosophy 
Though EVA may not have better informational value to capital markets, it can be very 
useful in improving productivity of a firm, if adapted as a corporate philosophy. 
Productivity should be measured in terms of creation of wealth for shareholders. An 
appropriate corporate philosophy should result in goal congruence and  should channel 
all efforts of the management and employees towards a pre-determined goal and 
strategies of the firm. A firm can enhance its value only if it is able to achieve optimal 
productivity, in terms of value over a long period of time. Over the years management 
experts and consultants have proposed many tools and techniques for improving 
productivity. Firms have tried these tools with varied degree of success. Many of the 
success stories in relation with implementation of those tools and techniques have taken 
their place in the annals of history.   
 
Some of the most notable of these are Management Information Systems (MIS), Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR), Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), and Brand Valuation 
in capital budgeting . Though all these tools have different perspectives, they aim at 
improving the productivity in physical terms and ignore the concept of value.  They 
facilitate increase in the productivity and efficiency of the firm that ultimately contributes 
to the bottom-line of the firm but increased bottom-line is no guarantee for increase in the 
shareholders value. 
 
Almost all the tools and techniques are used to reorient the employees’ perception of 
managing ‘value drivers’ and that culminates into empowerment of employees cutting 
across the hierarchical levels. All these tools aims at improving productivity by reducing 
redundancies in the ‘value chain’, BPR by simplifying existing processes and eliminating 
non value added activities, MIS  by improving the quality and flow of information and 
ERP by ensuring efficient allocation and utilization of  enterprise resources.  
 
The success of these tools reflects in reduced costs for delivering products or services to 
customers, though it may not always result in increasing shareholder value. These tools 




because they do not measure ‘economic surplus’ being generated by different activities. 
Moreover successful implementation of these tools and techniques involve extensive 
retraining of employees and constant monitoring of performance. In most cases the 
success or failure of these techniques depends on the effectiveness of communication of 
the philosophy and process of implementation to employees at all levels. The success of 
these tools to a great extent depends on how well the firm is able to resolve the problem 
of resistance to change and the ability of the management to earn commitment of 
employees, to the implementation of these techniques. Given this scenario the 
implementation of these management tools across the firm is a long drawn process and 
the possibility of success is not very high. 
   
In contrast EVA is an easy to understand concept.  EVA, as a corporate philosophy, 
entails using of EVA at every decision level in the organization. In fact EVA should be 
adapted as a culture within the organization rather than as a project. EVA when used as a 
corporate philosophy does not require precise estimation, therefore hurdles in estimating 
EVA does not come in the way of  building the EVA culture in an organization. A firm 
can roughly estimate its WACC a hurdle rate that is being used by firms in capital 
budgeting decisions. Therefore it is not difficult for employees to use EVA for decision-
making including operational decisions. 
 
There are more than 300 corporates, world wide that have adapted EVA as a corporate 
philosophy. Many of these organizations are successful multinationals like Coca-Cola, 
Bausch & Lomb, Briggs & Stratton and Herman Miller. Some of the state owned 
enterprises in U.S.A. including the U.S. Postal service that has the largest civilian labor 
force in the world, have adapted EVA culture to improve efficiency in services and to 
motivate the employees.  
 
The advantage of EVA over other similar tools is that it improves business literacy 
because of easy understandability and conceptual clarity. The one component that sets it 
apart over conventional measures is its consideration of the cost of capital and this is the 




Business literacy is the effort of management to convey to all the employees the fact that 
for any activity to be value enhancing the return generated should be over and above the 
cost of capital employed for that activity. This small shift in the outlook of the employees 
immediately raises the threshold limit of the returns generated to create value. Usually 
employees do not look at their actions from this perspective and therefore there is a need 
to continuously highlight the concept. 
 
As explained earlier compensation methods based on EVA work better in achieving the 
objective of goal congruence and minimize the agency cost. Use of EVA improves 
‘internal corporate governance’ in the sense that it motivates manager to get rid of value 
destructive activities and to invest only in those projects that are expected to enhance 
shareholder value.  
 
Ideally a management control system should motivate managers for ‘self control’ rather 
than managers are being controlled because human beings have general resistance to 
controls. Linking compensation with EVA helps employees in conducting a self-
examination of every action taken by them to ensure that it enhances EVA of the firm. 
Care should be taken to tie compensation to the enhancement of long term EVA rather 
than short term EVA. As discussed earlier, managers do have scope to enhance the short 
term EVA at the cost of long term value creation by rejecting good investment 
opportunities that have long gestation period or, avoiding discretionary costs or by 
targeting a capital structure that might reduce the WACC in the short run while 
enhancing the financial risk in the long run. One way to counter this limitation is to defer 
payment of a part of incentives.  
 
Empirical evidence supports the above observations. Empirical studies concluded that 
EVA, when used as an incentive compensation measure, tends to improve the value of 
the firm by inducing managers towards value creating activities (Biddle, Bowen and 
Wallace 1999). Using EVA or Residual Income measures for incentive compensation 
leads to:  




  disposal of selected assets and reduce new investments (the assumption is that these 
assets have failed in earning adequate returns when compared to the overall cost of 
capital) and 
  more share repurchases (consistent with distributing under performing capital to 
shareholders).  
It may be concluded that though EVA fails to provide additional information to the 
capital market, it can be used to improve the internal governance of a firm. 
 
The Indian Context  
India has found supporters for EVA. It has already earned favor with journalists and 
leaders in corporate reporting. However most of them do not calculate EVA rigorously, 
rather they take casual approach in calculating and reporting EVA. We have examined a 
study by Economic Times, the most popular business daily in India and the annual report 
of Infosys Technologies limited that has won prestigious ‘ best presented annual report’ 
being awarded by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) for five years in 
this context. 
 
The study published by Economic Times neither adjusted book capital to bring it closer 
to economic capital nor used rigorous model to compute the cost of equity. Perhaps the 
short cut was adopted by the study to circumvent difficulties in estimating equity and 
converting book capital into economic capital. 
 
Infosys Technologies Limited known for its transparency in financial statements, may be 
considered a pioneer in reporting EVA in annual report. A perusal of the EVA statement 
published by Infosys
4 in its annual report for the year 99-2000 reveals certain important 
shortcomings. 
 
Infosys has used book capital for computing EVA. It has not carried out any adjustment 
for converting book capital into economic capital. This distortion may not be material 




development expenditure. Similarly it has not adjusted the net income figure to bring it 
closer to the amount of cash flow generated by the firm. According to proponents of 
EVA, these adjustments are important in computing EVA. 
 
The cost of equity used by Infosys is also questionable. It has used CAPM for estimating 
the cost of equity. It has a uniform beta variant of 1.48, The average beta variants for 
software stocks in US for all the four years (1997-2000) covered in the statement. It 
appears that the beta variant has not been adjusted for sovereign risks and other factors. 
This might have distorted cost of equity. Moreover, it is not clear why a uniform beta 
should be used for all the years. It is now well established that beta does not remain 
constant over a long period, therefore it is appropriate to compute beta separately for 
each year. Similarly it has used market premium of 8 percent, 9 percent, 10 percent and 
10 percent for all the years 2000, 1999, 1998 and 1997 respectively. It appears that 
market premium has been estimated on certain assumptions best known to the preparers 
of the EVA statement. It is difficult to estimate the market premium in volatile markets, 
therefore in computing EVA there is no option but to estimate market premium based on 
certain assumptions. This makes EVA computation highly subjective therefore, in the 
absence of disclosures of those assumptions, the informative value of the EVA reduces 
very significantly and it carries only ornamental value to decorate the annual report. 
 
The EVA statement also shows a reduction in the cost of equity from 27.97 percent in 
1997 to 22.29 percent in 2000. This reduction is explained by the reduction in risk free 
debt cost from 13.6 percent in 1997 to 10.45 percent in 2000 and the reduction in market 
premium from 10 percent in 1997 to 8 percent in 2000. These reductions do not reflect 
the market reality because according to one calculation return on 91 day T-bills increased 
from 6.79 percent for fiscal year 1997-98 to 9 percent in fiscal year 1999-2000. If we use 
the cost of capital of 27.97% for 1999 and 2000, EVA for the year 2000 comes to 
Rs.8907.70 lakhs as against Rs.12,905.67 lakhs and for the year 1999 it comes to Rs. 
6427.25 lakhs as against Rs. 7077.60 lakhs reported in the EVA statements. Though it 
                                                                                                                                                                             




may not be concluded that Infosys has overstated EVA in its report, it may not be 
inappropriate to conclude that EVA figures reported in the annual report are incorrect. 
 
The above analysis shows the difficulties in computing EVA and also that companies are 
unable to resolve those difficulties. However the popularity of EVA has tempted the 
companies to report EVA as a public relations measure, even if such reporting is 
misleading. 
 
Indian companies have started using EVA for improving internal governance. The Tata 
Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) is using EVA to measure performance of its mines and 
other business segments. Managers of the company find the measure quite useful and are 
highly enthused by the use of this measure. It is expected that EVA will gain popularity 
more as a management planning and control tool. 
 
Conclusion  
The concept of EVA is based on the sound economic principle that firm value increases 
only if it is able to generate surplus over its cost of capital and therefore it is based on 
strong theoretical foundation. However its calculation involves significant subjectivity 
and this reduces its informative value. Moreover it fails to provide better signals to the 
capital market as compared to conventional accounting measures like ROI, however hard 
selling of EVA has contributed positively in highlighting the fundamental economic 
principle, long forgotten by managers. In India companies are using EVA internally as a 
performance measure for improving productivity that would lead to enhancement of 
shareholder value. However a dangerous trend has also set in, to use EVA casually for 
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Economic Times Study On Corporate Performance Monday 11 December 2000 
TOP 100 INDIAN  MANUFACTURING SECTOR   
COMPANY 99-2000 98-99 Rise/Fall  %
(Rs crore) 
RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 639.27 -203.15 842.42 
BAJAJ AUTO LTD.  382.73 384.16 -1.43  -0.37
HINDALCO INNDUSTRIES  356.14 288.31 67.83 23.53
HERO HONDA MOTORS  251.19 152.32 98.87 64.91
WIPRO 229.03 72.88 156.15  214.26
INFOSYS TECH  225.07 79.59 145.48  182.79
GLOBAL TELE SYSTEMS  168.34 44.66 123.68 276.94
PUNJAB TRACTORS  144.08 140.13 3.95  2.82
MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA  137.92 70.99 66.93  94.28
MRF 128.97 155.61 -26.64  -17.12
NIIT 118.86 92.50 26.36  28.50
SATYAM COMPUTER  107.04 52.49 54.55  103.92
RANBAXY LABARATORIES 103.42 31.06 72.36  232.97
ASIAN PAINTS  101.82 66.91 34.91  52.17
CIPLA 101.32 99.18 2.14  2.16
GUJARAT POWER GEN  87.44 34.16 53.28  155.97
ESCORTS 84.60 41.36 43.24  104.55
TVS SUZUKI  79.44 74.57 4.87  6.53
BPL 76.49 72.79 3.70  5.08
KIRLOSKAR OIL ENGINES  74.84 15.76 59.08  374.87
NAGARJUNA FERTILISERS  73.31 84.91 -11.60 -13.66
BSES 72.18 66.58 5.60  8.41
AUROBINDO PHARMA  71.00 50.77 20.23 39.85
MUKAND 70.24 5.76 64.48  1119.44
INDO GULF CORPORATION  67.78 -74.19  
GODREJ SOAPS  62.74 -41.44  
APPOLLO TYRES  61.87 43.28 18.59  42.95
NIRMA 61.76 82.60 -20.84  -25.23
TATA TEA  61.33 134.45 -73.12  -54.38
HCL INFO SYSTEMS  57.60 31.15 26.45  84.91
BRITTANIA INDUSTRIES  55.25 38.27 16.98 44.37
DABUR INDIA  51.76 28.07 23.69  84.40
GUJ AMBUJA CEMENTS  49.83 8.28 41.55  501.81
TRIVENI ENGINEERING  48.75 9.64 39.11  405.71
TRACTORS AND FARM EQUIP 48.44 69.07 -20.63 -29.87
CEAT 46.19 58.90 -12.71  -21.58
SRF 42.19 32.36 9.83  30.38
RALLIS INDIA  39.53 43.32 -3.79  -8.75
KEC INTERNATIONAL  39.39 40.13 -0.74 -1.84
MIRC ELECTRONICS  38.42 24.53 13.89  56.62
VIDEOCON APPLIANCES  38.09 19.99 18.10  90.55
SAMTEL COLOR  36.59 -5.79  
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES  36.32 69.07 -32.75 -47.42
TATA CHEMICALS  32.04 89.31 -57.27  -64.12
MAHAVIR SPINNING  30.15 30.90 -0.75 -2.43
EXIDE INDUSTRIES  28.96 18.67 10.29 55.12
SPIC 26.67 15.62 11.05  70.74
SUASHISH DIAMONDS  25.69 25.89 -0.20  -0.77
PAINTS LIMITED  24.29 18.33 5.96  32.52
MODI RUBBER  23.92 17.03 6.89  40.46
GODREJ AND BOYCE  22.15 0.33 21.82  6612.12
EID PARRY  22.07 5.02 17.05  339.64
MCDOWELL & CO  21.48 18.71 2.77  14.80




SURYA ROSHNI  14.94 5.49 9.45  172.13
TITAN INDUSTRIES  13.94 13.62 0.32 2.35
RUCHI SOYA  13.71 12.08 1.63  13.49
IVP 13.19 19.23 -6.04  -31.41
BUSHAN STEEL  9.22 -0.20  
VOLTAS 5.84 21.75 -15.91  -73.15
TUBE INVESTMENTS  5.69 -23.41  
 VAM ORGANIC CHEM  4.29 17.81 -13.52 -75.91
TATA SSL  1.88 -44.17  
EVEREADY INDUSTRIES  0.57 38.55 -37.98 -98.52
SURAT ELECTRICITY  0.19 -4.05  
JAIPRAKASH INDUSTRIES  -1.90 -23.72  
STERLITE INDUSTRIES  -2.27 -70.35  
INDIAN ALUMINIUM  -2.52 -9.35  
CENTURY ENKA  -2.63 -20.29  
LML -3.99 26.31  
MADRAS CEMENTS  -4.76 12.99  
KESORAM INC\DUSTRIES  -5.72 -12.43  
JINDAL IRON AND STEEL  -6.76 -37.32  
EICHER -8.34 10.27  
JK INDUSTRIES  -9.25 -19.12  
UNITED PHOSPHORUS  -9.82 -12.44  
BOMBAY DYEING  -13.11 -63.77  
USHA BELTRON   -16.94 4.42  
CENTURY TEXTILES  -17.57 -156.47  
BAJAJ TEMPO  -19.33 -31.51  
WOCKHARDT -20.70 -30.48  
ZUARI INDUSTRIES  -29.31 -42.99  
HIMACHAL FUTURISTIC  -30.51 -27.78  
BIRLA CORPORATION  -34.12 -49.66  
CHAMBAL FERTILISERS  -35.90 -19.34  
JINDAL POLYESTER  -37.32 -8.40  
HINDUSTAN MOTORS  -41.57 -27.42  
ORIENT PAPER  -41.85 -70.27  
GREAVES -43.00 38.99  
RAYMOND -43.65 11.43  
LARSEN AND TUBRO  -47.68 21.21  
CESC -54.16 -231.63  
VIDEOCON INERNATIONAL -70.68 -115.39  
TATA ENGINEERING  -81.54 -148.97  
GRASIM INDUSTRIES  -92.68 -161.68  
USHA ISPAT  -115.21 -100.36  
ACC -140.20 -14.46  
TATA STEEL  -185.82 -339.04  
SR STEEL  -658.23 -756.39  







TOP 100 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES OPERATING IN INDIA   
HINDUSTAN LEVER  1132.16 882.85 249.31 28.24
ITC 1035.33 724.82 310.51  42.84
CASTROL INDIA  209.41 163.28 46.13  28.25
NESTLE INDIA  134.16 108.06 26.10 24.15
NOVARTIS INDIA  121.19 85.09 36.10 42.43
MOTOR INDUSTRIES  107.97 70.14 37.83 53.93
SMITH LINE BEECHAM CON HEALTH  104.77 90.81 13.96  15.37
CUMMINS INDIA  80.23 56.06 24.17  43.11
GLAXO INDIA  66.94 84.71 -17.77 -20.98
SHAW WALLACE  66.46 53.25 13.21  24.81
KNOLL PHARMACEUTICALS  62.44 18.37 44.07  239.90
COLGATE PALMOLIVE  50.20 37.10 13.10  35.31
PROCTOR & GAMBLE  47.78 32.24 15.54  48.20
INGERSOLL RAND  47.48 52.81 -5.33 -10.09
I-FLEX SOLUTIONS  44.53 34.27 10.26  29.94
PFIZER 42.81 16.74 26.07  155.73
RHONE - POULENC  42.80 28.46 14.34 50.39
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON  41.08 31.84 9.24  29.02
ICI INDIA  34.85 54.67 -19.82  -36.25
CADBURY INDIA  33.96 18.65 15.31  82.09
SEIMENS 33.41 -42.12  
BURROUGHS WELCOME  32.94 23.42 9.52 40.65
HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL  31.99 18.95 13.04  68.81
BATA INDIA  30.42 12.58 17.84  141.81
WYETH LEDERIE  27.47 22.74 4.73  20.80
PHILIPHS INDIA  26.28 17.64 8.64  48.98
GERMAN REMEDIES  26.19 26.10 0.09  0.34
VIDIA 25.75 23.97 1.78  7.43
HUGHES SOFTWARE  24.44 8.31 16.13 194.10
POLARIS SOFTWARE  24.30 10.06 14.24  141.55
BAYER 23.68 27.72 -4.04  -14.57
INDIAN SHAVING PRODUCTS 22.77 14.31 8.46  59.12
GVK INDUSTRIES  22.10 32.83 -10.73 -32.68
VST INDUSTRIES  20.01 -83.17  
SEIMENS INFORMATION SYS  18.80 17.04 1.76  10.33
PARK DAVIS  18.36 10.41 7.95 76.37
E MERCK  17.48 27.07 -9.59  -35.43
CLARIANT 17.20 16.94 0.26  1.53
KRUPP INDUSTRIES  17.18 19.27 -2.09 -10.85
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT  16.82 23.56 -6.74  -28.61
CIBA SPECIALITY CHEM  16.49 11.17 5.32  47.63
SANDVIK ASIA  16.30 -5.26  
WARTSILA NSD  15.45 8.13 7.32  90.04
GOOD YEAR INDIA  14.82 18.62 -3.80 -20.41
HONDA SIEL POWER  14.36 17.35 -2.99 -17.23
BASF 14.16 6.31 7.85  124.41
ASTRA-IDL 14.05 11.15 2.90  26.01
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMA  13.92 30.97 -17.05  -55.05
GOODRICKE GROUP  12.99 32.91 -19.92 -60.53
SILVER LINE TECHNOLOGIES 12.60 25.56 -12.96 -50.70
STRIDES ARCOLAB  12.25 2.44 9.81  402.05
ASEA BROWN BOVERI  11.62 -0.26  
INFAR 11.28 7.92 3.36  42.42
COLOR CHEM  10.91 -12.35  
GULF OIL INDIA  10.82 11.11 -0.29  -2.61
KSB PUMPS  10.13 12.46 -2.33  -18.70
SEIMENS PUBLIC CUMMU  10.02 -13.89  




DUPHAR-INTERFRAN 9.14 1.19 7.95  668.07
MONSANTO INDIA  8.90 10.17 -1.27  -12.49
ALFA LAVEL  8.87 -4.92  
VESUVIUS INDIA  8.50 7.10 1.40  19.72
ASHOK LEYLAND  7.27 -50.75  
RECKITT AND COLEMAN  6.25 26.69 -20.44 -76.58
ATLAS COPCO  6.25 9.63 -3.38  -35.10
COATES INDIA  5.86 3.43 2.43  70.85
ZENSAR TECHNOLOGIES  5.69 13.55 -7.86 -58.01
FAG BEARINGS  5.16 3.71 1.45  39.08
ITW SIGNODE  4.73 -34.83  
GRINDWELL NORTON  4.72 1.17 3.55 303.42
SKF BEARINGS  4.52 -62.36  
IDL INDUSTRIES  3.93 3.24 0.69  21.30
YOKOGAWA BLUESTAR  3.91 0.89 3.02 339.33
FALCON TYRES  3.60 5.66 -2.06  -36.40
MATSUSHITA LAKHANPAL  3.14 5.11 -1.97 -38.55
VANAVIL DYES AND CHEM  2.31 3.45 -1.14 -33.04
CHICAGO PNEUMATIC  2.27 1.63 0.64 39.26
GEOFFREY MANNERS  2.04 1.30 0.74 56.92
CARRIER AIRCON  1.47 24.33 -22.86  -93.96
ASSAM CO  1.38 5.79 -4.41  -76.17
VASHISTI DETERGENTS  0.95 0.55 0.40  72.73
ELECTRIC LAMP MFRS  -0.17 1.94  
CABOT INDIA  -0.28 3.44  
GKN DRIVE SHAFTS  -0.71 -3.71  
ABBOT LABARATORIES  -0.83 0.93  
MATSUSHITA TELEVISION  -2.64 -6.59  
AVERY INDIA  -3.49 -0.92  
BAUSCH AND LOMB   -3.91 7.46  
ETERNIT EVEREST  -5.58 -9.51  
DENSO INDIA  -7.10 -3.07  
WIMCO -11.91 -12.98  
ION EXCHANGE  -11.95 -5.14  
HENKEL SPIC  -12.40 -7.50  
SAURASHTRA CEMENT  -22.36 -2.55  
WHIRLPOOL OF INDIA  -23.16 -90.30  
ISPAT ALLOYS  -29.00 -16.23  
MADHURA COATS  -31.73 -1.67  
GONTERMANN PEIPERS  -51.10 -43.92  
ITC BADRACHALAM  -58.84 -124.85  






EVA Statement Of Infosys As Published In The Annual Report 1999-2000 
Economic Value Added (EVA) Statement   
 
Economic Value-Added, Analysis   
 
Year ended march 31,  2000 1999 1998  1997
Average Capital Employed (Rs. In lakhs)  70386.70 24541.61 14289.67  9846.75
Average debt/total capital (%)    2.16
Beta variant  1.48 1.48 1.48  1.48
Risk-free debt cost (%)  10.45 12.00 12.15  13.60
Market Premium  8.00 9.00 10.00  10.00
Cost of equity (%)  22.29 25.32 26.95  28.40
Cost of Debt (post tax) (%)  NA NA NA  7.70
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (%)  22.29 25.32 26.95  27.97
PAT as a percentage of average capital employed (%)  40.63 54.16 42.24  33.91
Economic Value Added (EVA)   
operating profit   
(PBT excluding extraordinary income)  32564.86 15585.54 6586.33  3893.03
Less: tax  3970.00 2294.00 550.00  554.00
Less:cost of capital  15689.19 6213.94 3851.07  2754.34
Economic value-added  12905.67 7077.60 2185.26  584.69
Enterprise value   
Market value of equity  593317.00 967279.95 296342.20  73104.17
Less:cash and cash equivalents 50837.38 41665.91 5114.20  2877.82
Add: debt   
Enterprise value  5882979.62 925614.04 291228.00  70226.35
Ratios   
EVA as a percentage of average capital employed (%)  18.34 28.84 15.29  5.94
Enterprise value/average capital employed  83.58 37.72 20.38  7.13
 
Notes   
the cost of equity is calculated by using the following formula:   
 
return on risk-free investment + expected risk premium on equity investment/adjusted for average beta 
variant for software stocks in the US 
 
The figures above are based on Indian GAAP financial statements   
 
 